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2057 
THE THICKNESS OF BLOOD: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND COMMERCIAL DNA 
DATABASES 
Hannah Parman* 
Abstract: Law enforcement agencies increasingly use online commercial and open source 
DNA databases to identify suspects in cases that have long since gone cold. By uploading 
crime scene DNA to one of these websites, investigators can find family members who have 
used the website and build a family tree leading back to the owner of the original DNA. This 
is called “familial DNA searching.” The highest profile use of this investigative method to date 
occurred in California, but law enforcement in Washington State has been quick to begin 
utilizing the method as well. However, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution 
provides an enhanced privacy right to Washington residents when compared to the United 
States Constitution. This privacy right, which protects citizens’ private affairs from 
governmental intrusion without a warrant, is likely violated by law enforcement use of these 
databases in this manner. Washington courts should and will probably conclude that this 
investigative technique seriously threatens this crucial constitutional right. However, the 
Washington legislature should not wait for the courts to weigh in. Instead, lawmakers should 
pass legislation to ensure that this violation of citizens’ privacy is prohibited. 
INTRODUCTION 
So you see there is little danger of my forgetting them, and far less blood 
relations; for surely blood is thicker than water. 
—John Moore1 
 
Between 1974 and 1986, an unknown man committed at least fifty 
rapes and twelve murders across multiple California counties.2 For 
decades, the world would only know this man as the Golden State Killer.3 
Then in 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced a 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I wish to thank Professor 
Hugh Spitzer for his suggestions on drafts of this Comment. I also thank the editorial staff of 
Washington Law Review, particularly Ian Walsh, Monica Romero, and Robert Morgan, for their 
dedication and hard work. Finally, I have the deepest gratitude for the constant support of my wife, 
Natasha Parman, without whom this law school adventure never would have happened. 
1. 2 JOHN MOORE, ZELUCO: VARIOUS VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE, TAKEN FROM LIFE AND 
MANNERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 217 (4th ed. 1797).  
2. Aja Romano, DNA Profiles from Ancestry Websites Helped Identify the Golden State Killer 
Suspect, VOX (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17290288/golden-state-
killer-joseph-james-deangelo-dna-profile-match [https://perma.cc/SP79-ZFXX].  
3. Id. 
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renewed effort to solve what by that point was a very cold case.4 Two 
years into this effort, police arrested a seventy-two-year-old former police 
officer named Joseph James DeAngelo and charged him with twelve 
counts of first-degree murder.5 DeAngelo had been tracked down using 
familial DNA searching.6 Investigators had obtained his DNA from a 
crime scene decades before, but it did not match any existing entry when 
they entered the DNA into the FBI’s national DNA database.7 However, 
with the recent increased popularity of commercial DNA databases like 
23andMe and Ancestry.com, investigators no longer needed the Golden 
State Killer to contribute a sample to any government DNA database.8 
Instead, they simply checked crime scene DNA against GEDmatch, a free 
genealogy website with an extensive genomics database.9 Although 
DeAngelo’s DNA was not there, a distant relative’s was, allowing 
investigators to narrow the suspect pool to a single family and eventually 
to DeAngelo himself.10 Finally, nearly half a century after he committed 
his crimes, DeAngelo pled guilty to the Golden State Killer murders and 
kidnappings.11 
Similar stories have played out in Washington State. In 1987, the body 
of a young Canadian woman named Tanya Van Cuylenborg was 
discovered in rural Skagit County.12 She had been raped, shot in the head, 
and left in a ditch.13 Two days later, the body of the boyfriend with whom 
 
4. Cold Case Killer: Help Us Catch the East Area Rapist, FBI: NEWS (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/help-us-catch-the-east-area-rapist [https://perma.cc/R8VC-
HVUB]. 
5. Cheri Mossburg & Darran Simon, Suspected Golden State Killer Now Charged in 12 Killings, 
CNN (May 11, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/10/us/suspected-golden-state-killer-
charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/WD8D-FBSJ]. 
6. Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the ‘Golden State 







11. Eliot C. McLaughlin & Stella Chan, Hearing Details Ghastly Crimes of Golden State Killer as 
He Pleads Guilty to Killings, CNN (June 29, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/ 
29/us/golden-state-killer-plea-expected/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8WK-7EDN]. DeAngelo was 
not charged with the rapes due to the statute of limitations. Id. 
12. Sara Jane Green, Investigators Use DNA, Genealogy Database to ID Suspect in 1987 Double 
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she had been traveling, Jay Cook, was found under a bridge.14 In 2018, 
Washington law enforcement arrested William Earl Talbott II after 
identifying his second cousins through GEDmatch and building a family 
tree from that information.15 Law enforcement said that Talbott had never 
been on any list of suspects, and no tip about him had ever been 
provided.16 Like DeAngelo, Talbott had not uploaded his DNA to a 
genealogy site.17 
Use of public DNA databases in this manner by law enforcement in 
Washington seems to be picking up steam. Less than a month after 
Talbott’s arrest, another man was arrested for the 1986 rape and murder 
of twelve-year-old Michella Welch in Tacoma following a search of 
commercial DNA databases.18 More recently, in July 2020, the 
Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office arrested a sixty-two-year-old Bothell 
man named Alan Edward Dean for the 1993 murder of fifteen-year-old 
Melissa Lee.19 The sheriff’s press release stated that Dean’s arrest was the 
county’s third involving assistance from Parabon NanoLabs, a DNA 
technology company.20 Parabon used crime scene DNA to find Dean’s 
relatives on a public genetic genealogy website, at which point detectives 
acquired Dean’s DNA from an abandoned cigarette butt in order to 
confirm his identity as Lee’s killer.21 
This increasingly popular investigatory method, often called “familial 
DNA searching”22 or “investigative genetic genealogy,”23 has raised both 





17. Selk, supra note 6; Green, supra note 12. 
18. Joshua Bessex, DNA in a Genealogy Database and a Used Napkin Link Suspect to Michella 
Welch Murder, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (June 22, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.thenews 
tribune.com/news/local/crime/article213651959.html [https://perma.cc/YY79-TP6D]. 
19. Press Release, Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., Suspect Arrested in 1993 Homicide Cold Case 




22. SARA DEBUS-SHERRILL & MICHAEL B. FIELD, UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING: 
POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND POTENTIAL IMPACT 2 (2017),  https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/251043.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET5Y-XUGW]. 
23. Natalie Ram, Investigative Genetic Genealogy and the Future of Genetic Privacy, 16 SCITECH 
LAW. 18, 19 (2020).  
24. Sarah Kellogg, To Catch a Criminal: Ethics and Privacy in DNA Familial Searches, 33 WASH. 
LAW. 29, 30–31 (2018). 
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issues.25 As a University of Washington ethicist asked when being 
interviewed about the Golden State Killer case, “[DeAngelo] was a 
horrible man and it is good that he was identified, but does the end justify 
the means?”26 As of 2018, Ancestry.com and 23andMe—two of the more 
popular commercial DNA databases—had the DNA of ten million and 
five million customers, respectively, in their systems.27 Although The New 
York Times said in 2018 that “[i]t is unlikely that the apparent success of 
the method in the Golden State Killer case will spur a rush to use 
genealogy databases to solve crimes,”28 it appears that rush has arrived. 
One news article from February 2020 describes the “dozens of cold cases” 
solved in this manner in the previous two years and goes on to list nine of 
those cases which were “very, very old.”29 But the DNA hosted on these 
sites does not only belong to the individuals who have made the choice to 
upload it—their non-consenting siblings, parents, children, and cousins 
share some of that DNA as well.30 
This investigative technique raises particular concern when used by law 
enforcement in Washington. It is “well settled that article I, section 7 of 
the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to individual 
privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”31 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the privacy rights 
protected by the Washington Constitution “[are] not confined to the 
subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens who, due to well 
publicized advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect 
diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives.”32 Although it is well 
established that the collection of DNA is a search under the Washington 
Constitution,33 Washington courts have yet to address whether the use of 
 
25. See generally Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in 
Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
263 (2006).  
26. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thicket of 




29. Robert Gearty, DNA, Genetic Genealogy Helping to Solve the Coldest of Cold Cases, FOX 
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/dna-genetic-genealogy-helping-to-solve-the-
coldest-of-cold-cases [https://perma.cc/2M58-PWJ7].  
30. Id. 
31. State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002). 
32. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984). 
33. See Charles W. Johnson & Debra L. Stephens, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 
2019 Update, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1293 (2019) (“[T]he taking of . . . DNA samples is considered 
a search within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7.”); see also State 
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crime scene DNA to search public databases for family relationships 
violates article I, section 7. 
This Comment discusses law enforcement DNA usage and familial 
DNA searching under the Washington Constitution. Part I describes DNA 
and its historical use in crime scene investigations. It also discusses 
modern DNA use by Washington law enforcement in particular. Part II 
discusses specifics of the familial DNA searching process. Part III 
outlines the history and accepted interpretation of article I, section 7 of the 
Washington Constitution, particularly as it relates to DNA. Part IV 
evaluates law enforcement use of familial DNA searching within the 
framework of article I, section 7, concluding that this investigative 
method is likely a violation of the Washington Constitution. Finally, 
Part V argues that the threat to Washingtonians’ privacy presented by this 
investigative technique is so great that lawmakers should not wait for the 
constitutional analysis to play out in court, but instead should take active 
steps to restrict Washington law enforcement’s use of familial 
DNA searching. 
I. DNA AND THE HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE 
A. What is DNA? 
Deoxyribonucleic acid, more commonly known as DNA, is the unique 
material found in almost all organisms.34 The information contained 
within DNA is made up of four chemical bases, and 99% of human DNA 
is the same in all people.35 All DNA is hereditary, meaning it is passed 
down to biological family members.36 Paternal ancestry, passed by fathers 
to their male children, can be tracked through the Y chromosome.37 
Similarly, mothers pass mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), found in the 
mitochondria of cells, to all their children.38 Because mtDNA is passed in 
 
v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007) (acknowledging that DNA’s potential 
to expose personal information could make it a privacy interest “in some circumstances”); State v. 
Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 828–29, 147 P.3d 1201, 1238 (2006) (holding that the use of a DNA 
profile did not implicate article I, section 7 because the DNA was already in the government’s 
possession), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 
1134 (2014). 
34. What Is DNA?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: MEDLINEPLUS (Feb. 11, 
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna [https://perma.cc/9K4Z-7C4W]. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Rafi Letzter, How Do DNA Ancestry Tests Really Work?, LIVESCIENCE (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.livescience.com/62690-how-dna-ancestry-23andme-tests-work.html 
[https://perma.cc/TSY9-DFN9]. 
38. Id.; see What Is DNA?, supra note 34. 
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this manner, it can be used to create ancestral trees.39 By obtaining access 
to a family member’s DNA, one can have at least partial access to the 
DNA profile of many other members of that person’s biological family, 
including immediate and extended family members.40 
DNA has been a useful law enforcement tool since DNA profiling was 
discovered in 1984.41 Forensic DNA profiling involves matching unique 
patterns in alleles (the variant forms of genes that create hereditable 
traits)42 and short tandem repeats (STRs).43 In the United States, law 
enforcement searches match alleles at twenty specific loci, or locations on 
a person’s genome, which are non-coding and as such cannot be 
connected to the person’s observable characteristics.44 Law enforcement 
agencies are able to perform high-stringency searches that require all 
alleles to match exactly at all loci.45 This traditional version of DNA 
profiling finds exact matches between different crime scene samples, as 
well as matches with DNA taken from convicted offenders and arrestees.46 
Moderate and low stringency levels allow for partial matches, which can 
allow the identification of potential family relationships.47 However, 
existing law enforcement software is not designed to identify familial 
matches,48 causing some agencies to turn towards other technology that is 
designed for this purpose—technology like GEDmatch.49 
B. The History of DNA “Fingerprinting” 
DNA was first used in a criminal investigation shortly after a geneticist 
at the University of Leicester in England discovered its potential for 
identifying unknown individuals.50 The inventor of this “DNA 
fingerprinting,” as it became known, assisted police in solving two 
 
39. A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 98 (2d ed. 2018). 
40. Id. 
41. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 1. 
42. CUTICCHIA, supra note 39, at 28. 
43. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 1. 
44. Id. at 2. Observable characteristics include race, gender, and health. Id. 
45. Id. at 3. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 2. 
48. For example, a search of CODIS, the national DNA database in which states participate, does 
not “statistically rank partial matches or take into consideration allele frequency.” Joyce Kim, Danny 
Mammo, Marni B. Siegel & Sara H. Katsanis, Policy Implications for Familial Searching, 2 
INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 1, 3 (2011), http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/2/1/22 
[https://perma.cc/W4T2-GN6U]. 
49. Id.  
50. MICHAEL LYNCH, SIMON A. COLE, RUTH MCNALLY & KATHLEEN JORDAN, TRUTH MACHINE: 
THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING 49 (2008). 
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rape-murder cases called the Black Pad murders in 1986 and 1987.51 
Blood samples were taken from thousands of men in the local area as part 
of the investigation.52 Finally, after law enforcement discovered one man 
had submitted a blood sample given to him by a friend in place of his own, 
the man was arrested, tested, and eventually convicted.53 
DNA fingerprinting quickly migrated to the United States, where its 
popularity among investigators—and moreover, the public—boomed.54 
Proponents and the media lauded DNA as “the perfect fingerprint: 
unfakeable, unique, and running in families.”55 The legitimacy and 
perceived perfection of DNA fingerprinting was only reinforced by early 
cases where challenges to the admissibility of the evidence were 
unsuccessful.56 Throughout this time period, proponents and the media 
continued to use the term “DNA fingerprinting” when referring to forensic 
DNA use.57 Soon the public developed a steadfast love affair with DNA 
in the criminal investigation and prosecution context, believing that it 
could be used to provide absolute identification every time.58 
However, DNA evidence as it is used today is not infallible.59 The first 
successful challenge to the admissibility of DNA evidence occurred in 
1989, with the New York murder trial of José Castro.60 Other successful 
challenges soon followed, focusing on three main areas: (1) technical 
problems with collection, handling, and analysis; (2) statistical issues with 
DNA “matches;” and (3) organizational and administrative 
complications.61 Despite the potential for error, DNA’s place in our 





54. Id. DNA fingerprinting was first used in the 1987 Florida murder trial of Tommie Lee 
Andrews. Id. 
55. Id. at 51 (quoting Genetic Fingerprints: Cherchez la Gene, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1986,  
at 68–69). 
56. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (denying appeal based on 
use of DNA evidence); New Jersey v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) 
(allowing use of DNA evidence for the first time in New Jersey). In both cases, the courts determined 
that DNA evidence was sufficiently reliable for use in trial. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849–51; Williams, 
599 A.2d at 967–68. 
57. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 50, at 51. 
58. Id. 
59. Naomi Elster, How Forensic DNA Evidence Can Lead to Wrongful Convictions, JSTOR DAILY 
(Dec.  6,  2017),  https://daily.jstor.org/forensic-dna-evidence-can-lead-wrongful-convictions 
[https://perma.cc/MPN3-DXJW]. 
60. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 50, at 57. 
61. Id. at 57–62. 
62. Id. 
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evidence and it can play an important role in their decision to convict or 
acquit.63 This reliance may have particularly serious implications for trials 
concerning cold cases, given that the weight of potentially unreliable 
DNA evidence may be overinflated when other evidence is no longer 
easily accessible. 
C. DNA is Commonly Used by Washington Law Enforcement Today 
Washington participates in the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS), the United States’ national DNA database.64 CODIS is “the 
generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of support for criminal 
justice DNA databases as well as the software used to run these 
databases.”65 One part of CODIS is the FBI-sponsored National DNA 
Index System (NDIS), which contains DNA from federal, state, and local 
forensic laboratories.66 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Army, 
and Puerto Rico submit DNA profiles to NDIS.67 The Washington CODIS 
database includes samples from certain offenders, crime scenes, missing 
persons, biological relatives of missing persons, and unidentified 
recovered humans (both living and deceased).68 Samples uploaded to the 
state CODIS database are automatically searched for matches.69 There are 
three jurisdictional levels of CODIS (national, state, and local), each with 
different criteria for when DNA profiles may be included.70 
Both the state and federal databases are heavily used.71 As of November 
2019, NDIS contains over fourteen million offender profiles, three million 
arrestee profiles, and nearly one million forensic profiles whereas 
Washington’s CODIS database contains nearly 300,000 offender profiles 
 
63. Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, THE ATL. (June 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747 
[https://perma.cc/J468-F9TG] (“[S]exual-assault cases involving DNA evidence . . . were twice as 
likely to reach trial and 33 times as likely to result in a guilty verdict; homicide cases were 14 times 
as likely to reach trial and 23 times as likely to end in a guilty verdict.”). 
64. WASH. STATE PATROL, CODIS LABORATORY: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (2017), 
https://www.wsp.wa.gov/forensics/docs/crimelab/codis_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY5V-
T43U]. 




67. H.R. REP. NO. 1326, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2019). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 3. 
71. See CODIS – NDIS Statistics, FBI: BIOMETRIC ANALYSIS, https://www.fbi.gov/services/ 
laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/Y9YQ-N6ZM]. 
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and 11,000 forensic profiles.72 In 2018, Washington State Patrol’s Crime 
Laboratory Division received 11,987 samples for CODIS resulting in 
643 hits.73 
State statutes regulate the collection and use of DNA by Washington 
law enforcement.74 DNA samples may “be used only for purposes related 
to criminal investigation, identification of human remains or missing 
persons, or improving the operation of the system authorized under 
RCW 43.43.752 through 43.43.758.”75 A state statute also mandates DNA 
collection from certain individuals, including anyone convicted of a 
felony or a variety of misdemeanors, many with sexual elements.76 Unlike 
some states,77 Washington does not collect DNA upon arrest, although the 
legislature has considered changing this multiple times.78 
 
72. Id. 
73. WASH. STATE PATROL, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2019). 
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.753 (2020). 
75. Id. 
76. See id. § 43.43.754. 
(1) A biological sample must be collected for purposes of DNA identification analysis from:  
(a) Every adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony, or any of the following crimes (or 
equivalent juvenile offenses):  
(i) Assault in the fourth degree where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 was 
pleaded or proven (RCW 9A.36.041, 9.94A.030);  
(ii) Assault in the fourth degree with sexual motivation (RCW 9A.36.041, 9.94A.835);  
(iii) Communication with a minor for immoral purposes (RCW 9.68A.090);  
(iv) Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.170);  
(v) Failure to register (chapter 9A.44 RCW);  
(vi) Harassment (RCW 9A.46.020);  
(vii) Patronizing a prostitute (RCW 9A.88.110);  
(viii) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.096);  
(ix) Stalking (RCW 9A.46.110);  
(x) Indecent exposure (RCW 9A.88.010);  
(xi) Violation of a sexual assault protection order granted under chapter 7.90 RCW; and  
(b) every adult or juvenile individual who is required to register under RCW 9A.44.130. 
Id. 
77. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DNA ARRESTEE LAWS 1 (2013), 
https://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G8N-85N7]. Thirty 
states permit the collection and analysis of DNA samples from people who have been arrested or 
charged with certain crimes, a practice upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. 
King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). Id. 
78. See Gene Johnson, Washington Considers Collecting DNA Upon Arrest in Serious Crime, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 5, 2012, 8:19 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-
considers-collecting-dna-upon-arrest-in-serious-crime/ [https://perma.cc/GZC2-K6PC] (discussing 
bills before the state legislature that would allow collection of DNA when someone is arrested for a 
felony or for violating a domestic-violence protection order); see also S. 6366, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2016) (amending state law to require DNA sample collection from “adults charged with a 
crime against persons, . . . residential burglary, or assault in the fourth degree”); S. 6314, 63rd Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014) (amending state law to require DNA sample collection from “adults arrested 
for or charged with ranked felony offenses . . . and other crimes”). 
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II. FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING IS A NEW ADVANCEMENT 
AND LEGISLATURES HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN TO 
ADDRESS IT 
Law enforcement use of DNA is not a new development, but familial 
DNA searching has only recently become relevant.79 This Part discusses 
the intention and basic scientific parameters of familial DNA searching 
and the current legal status of law enforcement use of familial DNA 
searching in the United States. 
A. Familial DNA Searching Background 
According to the FBI, familial DNA searching is “an intentional or 
deliberate search of the database . . . for the purpose of potentially 
identifying close biological relatives of the unknown forensic sample 
associated with the crime scene profile.”80 Investigators using CODIS for 
familial DNA searching first run a low-stringency search to identify a 
relative of the perpetrator.81 This can result in hundreds of matches, so a 
variety of additional measures—including additional testing and 
research—are used to narrow the field.82 
The samples contained in commercial DNA databases are much less 
limiting.83 Customers of sites like 23andMe or Ancestry.com may 
voluntarily submit the raw DNA data obtained from those sites to 
GEDmatch.84 These profiles contain information about 600,000 locations 
within a customer’s genome.85 These locations are identified by looking 
for single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).86 SNPs are less variable 
(and more likely to produce incorrect matches) than the STRs stored in 
CODIS but lend themselves more readily to identifying distant relatives.87 
 
79. See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy Database, THE 
ATL. (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-
genealogy-database/561695/ [https://perma.cc/Z9WQ-T3V8]. 
80. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 65. 
81. Kim et al., supra note 48, at 2. 
82. Id. at 3–4. These additional measures are intended to eliminate matches which do not share a 
family relationship with the target DNA and are just coincidentally similar. Id. at 3. These measures 
include retesting Y-chromosome STR markers, analyzing mitochondrial DNA, inferring relationships 
based on the number of shared alleles, statistical analysis, retesting with a focus on shared alleles, and 
public records reviews. Id. at 3–4. However, none of these additional measures is a perfect fix for 
CODIS’s inherent familial search issues. See id. 
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Because the databases owned by law enforcement are too outdated to 
contain SNP information, investigators have begun using open-source 
ancestry sites to solve cold cases through familial DNA searching.88 As of 
2019, this meant that law enforcement had the ability to search the genetic 
profiles of nearly one million GEDmatch users.89 
Both the Golden State Killer and William Earl Talbott II, the suspect 
from the 1987 Seattle-area double homicide,90 were identified using 
GEDmatch.91 In both instances, investigators created a fake profile on the 
site and uploaded crime scene DNA.92 At the time, nothing indicated to 
site users that law enforcement agencies may use their data in this 
manner.93 GEDmatch has since updated its terms of service, which now 
expressly permit law enforcement use for certain violent crimes: 
When you upload Raw Data to GEDmatch, you agree that the 
Raw Data is one of the following: 
Your DNA; 
DNA of a person for whom you are a legal guardian; 
DNA of a person who has granted you specific authorization to 
upload their DNA to GEDmatch; 
DNA of a person known by you to be deceased; 
DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to 
identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another 
individual, where “violent crime” is defined as murder, 
nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or 
aggravated assault; 
DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to identify 
remains of a deceased individual; 
An artificial DNA kit (if and only if: (1) it is intended for 
research purposes; and (2) it is not used to identify anyone in the 
GEDmatch database); or 
DNA obtained from an artifact (if and only if: (1) you have a 
reasonable belief that the Raw Data is DNA from a previous 
owner or user of the artifact rather than from a living individual; 
and (2) that previous owner or user of the artifact is known to 
 
88. Id. 
89. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile Is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said 
Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-
search-warrant.html [https://perma.cc/U9GS-CMF6]. 
90. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
91. Id.; Green, supra note 12. 
92. Zhang, supra note 79. 
93. Id. 
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you to be deceased).94 
After this policy change, existing users were required to read the 
updated terms of service in order to continue using the site.95 GEDmatch 
also now allows users to opt-in or opt-out of comparison with “DNA kits 
identified as being uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes”—meaning, 
presumably, DNA uploaded by law enforcement in order to identify a 
perpetrator or the remains of an unknown decedent.96 However, a judge 
in Florida recently granted a warrant that would override the GEDmatch 
opt-in requirement and allow a detective to search the full database.97 
Policy experts believe that this will likely encourage other law 
enforcement agencies to request similar warrants from the larger 
databases, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com—raising questions about 
the efficacy of any policies the sites have restricting law 
enforcement searches.98 
B. Lawmakers Are Just Now Beginning to Regulate Familial DNA 
Searching 
Today, familial searches conducted by police using GEDmatch and 
other databases have little oversight.99 Similar activity using CODIS, 
while more regulated, also lacks review because these searches are 
regulated by the individual states.100 The patchwork of state and national 
policies governing familial DNA searching illustrates the sporadic 
regulation of this investigative technique.101 Familial DNA searching is 
not performed at the national level, but Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
perform this type of search on state-government DNA databases.102 
Maryland and the District of Columbia, on the other hand, have laws 
 
94. Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4AHW-GKYN] (emphasis added). 
95. Debbie Kennett, Updates to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at GEDmatch, CRUWYS 
NEWS BLOG (May 21, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://cruwys.blogspot.com/2018/05/updates-to-terms-of-
service-and-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/7FP3-3PHS]. 
96. GEDMATCH, supra note 94. 
97. Hill & Murphy, supra note 89. 
98. Id. 
99. Zhang, supra note 79. 
100. Id. 
101. See 34 U.S.C. § 40702; Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, 264 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 
9, 10–11 (2009) (“States’ legislation requiring preconviction DNA collection varies . . . . State laws 
also vary with regard to how samples may be used beyond law enforcement and quality 
control purposes.”). 
102. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 65. 
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specifically prohibiting familial searching of their statewide databases.103 
Maryland’s law prohibits anyone from “perform[ing] a search of the 
statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender 
in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological 
relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”104 
The District of Columbia’s law provides that DNA collected by an agency 
“shall not be searched for the purpose of identifying a family member 
related to the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”105 
Legislators considering a regulatory framework around familial DNA 
searching have expressed broader concerns about the threats it may pose 
to privacy rights.106 In fact, the sponsor of Maryland’s bill was specifically 
concerned that use of DNA databases in this manner would be an 
unreasonable search and seizure.107 As the same search technique 
becomes more commonly used in Washington,108 the state constitutional 
implications become relevant as well. 
III. WASHINGTON’S ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 BROADLY 
PROTECTS PRIVACY INTERESTS 
Where the legal status of DNA searching generally in Washington is 
concerned, it is well established that the collection of DNA samples is 
considered a search under article I, section 7 of the Washington 
Constitution.109 However, once a DNA sample is lawfully in police 
possession, an additional warrant is not required to compare it to unrelated 
cases or to evidence from a new crime scene.110 It is also a constitutional 
right of all persons to refuse to consent to warrantless sampling of their 
DNA.111 As of 2020, the Washington State Patrol has a consent form 
 
103. Id.  
104. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506 (LexisNexis 2020). 
105. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4151 (2020). 
106. Natalie Jones, Maryland House Bill Seeks to Prohibit Using Familial DNA Databases to Solve 
Crime, BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2019, 10:29 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-
maryland-house-bill-dna-databases-0221-story.html [https://perma.cc/7NAF-K5BC] (“Because 
DNA is genetic and is shared between relatives, your privacy could be violated by someone other 
than you, and in many cases, this data could be used against you because the control of data about 
you is in other people’s hands.”). 
107. Id. (“[S]earching through a DNA database seems to violate both the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which both protect individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
108. See Green, supra note 12; Bessex, supra note 18; Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Press 
Release, supra note 19. 
109. Johnson & Stephens, supra note 33, at 1293. 
110. Id. at 1365, 1402. 
111. State v. Gauthier, 174 Wash. App. 257, 163, 298 P.3d 126, 130 (2013). 
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online to be used when collecting DNA from a family member in order to 
potentially identify a missing person.112 But there is no such form for 
collecting DNA from a family member in order identify a suspect or 
compare it to crime scene DNA.113 
Although Washington does not have a statute that addresses familial 
DNA searching, residents of the state can still rely on article I, section 7 
of the Washington Constitution. This Part reviews the existing article I, 
section 7 jurisprudence and the protections it offers, the courts’ objective 
and adaptive applications of article I, section 7 to new technologies, and 
article I, section 7 cases related specifically to DNA. 
A. Washington Courts Have Long Maintained that Article I, Section 7 
is More Protective than the Fourth Amendment 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states: “No person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”114 The Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly 
held that “authority of law” can be provided by a warrant based on 
probable cause or one of the “few ‘jealously and carefully drawn 
exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.”115 These exceptions are: consent, 
searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, plain view, 
investigative stops, and exigent circumstances.116 The exigent 
circumstances exception applies when “obtaining a warrant . . . would 
compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction 
of evidence.”117 
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that article I, section 7 is 
more protective of individual privacy rights than the Fourth 
Amendment.118 The 1889 State Constitutional Convention explicitly 
 
112. WASH. STATE PATROL: CRIME LAB’Y DIV., CONSENT FOR FAMILY REFERENCE 
SAMPLE COLLECTION, TESTING, AND CODIS ENTRY (Dec. 2018), https://wsp.wa.gov/ 
forensics/docs/crimelab/consent_family_reference.docx [https://perma.cc/TF3J-GZVY] (form).  
113. See generally Crime Laboratory Division, WASH. STATE PATROL, 
http://www.wsp.wa.gov/forensics/crimlabs.htm [https://perma.cc/AW74-WGYH]. 
114. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
115. State v. Witkowski, 3 Wash. App. 2d 318, 336, 415 P.3d 639, 648 (2018); State v. Houser, 95 
Wash. 2d 143, 149, 622 P2d 1218, 1222 (1980) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
759 (1979)). 
116. State v. Hendrikson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996). 
117. State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash. 2d 364, 370, 236 P.3d 885, 888 (2010) (quoting State v. Smith, 
165 Wash. 2d 511, 517, 199 P.3d 386, 389 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
118. State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002) (“[I]t is well settled that 
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to individual privacy 
rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
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rejected a state provision identical to Fourth Amendment in favor of the 
broader version seen the Washington Constitution today, in part to ensure 
that “interests that were threatened by new technologies” would be 
protected.119 This was likely due in part to the failure of the United States 
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States120 to extend the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections to broader privacy interests such as “personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property.”121 
Two cases in particular elucidate the differences between the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 7. In one case, State v. Boland,122 the 
Supreme Court of Washington considered the constitutionality of law 
enforcement searching a defendant’s curbside trash can without a 
warrant.123 Just two years prior, the United States Supreme Court had held 
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment in items discarded in curbside garbage.124 Notwithstanding 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of 
Washington found that law enforcement’s search of a trash can was an 
intrusion of a private affair and thus protected by article I, section 7.125 
Although acknowledging that it may not be unreasonable for a third party 
to search another’s trash, the Court’s majority stated that “average persons 
would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their trash 
cans will be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion.”126 In 
 
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
Washington courts previously utilized the six criteria established by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in State v. Gunwall to determine when the Washington constitution is more protective 
than the U.S. Constitution. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 814–15 (1986). The six Gunwall 
criteria are: (1) “The textual language of the State Constitution”; (2) “Significant differences in the 
texts of parallel provisions in the federal and state constitutions”; (3) “State constitutional and 
common law history”; (4) “Preexisting state law”; (5) “Differences in structure between the federal 
and state constitutions”; and (6) “Matters of particular state interest or local concern.” Id. Because 
once the Court has done such an analysis on a specific legal issue it declines to do so again, 
Washington courts no longer perform this analysis on these two constitutional provisions where 
privacy rights are concerned. State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 348, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (1999).  
119. Charles W. Johnson & Scott P. Beetham, The Origin of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington 
State Constitution, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431, 446 (2008); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178, 
622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980). 
120. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
121. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 119, at 447 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627). 
122. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). 
123. Id. at 574, 800 P.2d at 1113. 
124. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). 
125. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 578, 800 P.2d at 1116. 
126. Id. (emphasis added). 
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sum, garbage in trash cans is protected from governmental intrusion by 
the Washington Constitution, but not its federal counterpart. 
The second case established that article I, section 7 requires 
individualized suspicion to be present before a search.127 In City of Seattle 
v. Mesiani,128 a group of plaintiffs challenged a sobriety checkpoint 
program orchestrated by the city.129 All motorists were stopped at the 
checkpoints, “without warrants or individualized suspicion of any 
criminal activity.”130 Finding that the checkpoints involved seizures, the 
Court then determined that they did not fall within an exception to the 
warrant requirement.131 Based on this, the Court held that the checkpoints 
were a violation of both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment.132 
However, this ruling was in direct contrast to a United States Supreme 
Court case, two years after Mesiani, in which that Court held that a similar 
sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.133 
Together, Boland and Mesiani illustrate how protective Washington 
courts are of individual privacy rights under article I, section 7. These 
cases also illustrate how this portion of the Washington Constitution is 
more protective than its federal counterpart when compared to similar 
cases involving the privacy interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.134 
 
127. See City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 455, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988). 
128. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).  
129. Id. at 455, 755 P.2d at 776. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 457, 755 P.2d at 777. The city argued that the searches were permitted under a previous 
Washington case. Id. at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d at 777 n.1 (citing State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 
605 P.2d 1279 (1980)). The Court rejected this argument, as that case was “limited to situations in 
which there was reliable information that a serious felony had recently been committed . . . far 
different from an inference from statistics that there are inebriated drivers in the area.” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
132. Id. at 457–60, 755 P.2d at 777–78. 
133. Id. at 460, 755 P.2d at 778; Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). One 
Washington Court of Appeals stated that while Sitz “imperiled” the Fourth Amendment holding in 
Mesiani, “Mesiani . . . survive[s] since it rested primarily on [article I, section 7].” City of Seattle v. 
Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 49 & n.4, 834 P.2d 73, 77 & n.4 (1992). 
134. Compare State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990) (holding that 
a privacy right to trash on the curb was protected under article I, section 7), with California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of trash on the curb was 
permitted under the Fourth Amendment). Compare Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 460, 755 P.2d at 778 
(holding that a sobriety checkpoint program violated article I, section 7), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 
(holding that a sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment). 
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B. Private Affairs Are Objective and Guarded Against Technological 
Advancement 
Under article I, section 7, a search occurs when the State disturbs 
“those privacy interests which citizens of [Washington] have held, and 
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a 
warrant.”135 In determining whether something is a private affair, courts 
“look at the ‘nature and extent of the information which may be obtained 
as a result of the government conduct’ and at the historical treatment of 
the interest asserted.”136 This “interest asserted”137 encompasses all 
“private affairs,”138 in contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s limited 
protection of “a person, his house, papers and effects,”139 and has included 
land,140 temporary lodgings,141 driver’s records held by the government,142 
automobile trunks,143 and DNA.144 Voluntary exposure can negate an 
asserted privacy interest.145 
Three cases exemplify how the courts weigh objective and actual 
expectations of privacy under article I, section 7. These cases show that 
individuals in Washington are entitled to privacy in more than just their 
possessions. In State v. Jorden,146 law enforcement officers performed 
random warrant checks on the names in the guest registry at a motel, as 
was their practice.147 Guests were asked for identification and told it 
would be kept on file, but were “not told of the possibility for random, 
suspicionless searches of the registry by law enforcement.”148 Upon 
finding outstanding felony warrants for Timothy Jorden, officers entered 
 
135. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984). 
136. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 869, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (quoting State v. Miles, 160 
Wash. 2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864, 868 (2007)). 
137. Id. at 869, 319 P.3d at 12. 
138. Id. at 868, 319 P.3d at 12.  
139. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155. 
140. Id. 
141. State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 126, 156 P.3d 893, 896 (2007). 
142. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46, 50 (2002). 
143. State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 958 P.2d 982, 985 (1998). 
144. State v. Athan. 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007). 
145. Id. at 366, 158 P.3d at 33. 
146. 160 Wash. 2d 121, 156 P.3d 893 (2007). 
147. Id. at 123–24, 156 P.3d at 894–95. The program, called the “Lakewood Crime-Free Hotel 
Motel Program,” encouraged police to “review the guest registries of hotels and motels on a random 
basis and without individualized or particularized suspicion.” Id. This review included random 
criminal checks of names in the guest registries. Id. 
148. Id. at 124, 156 P.3d at 895. 
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his motel room and found drug paraphernalia and crack cocaine.149 Jorden 
then appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance.150 In determining that Jorden’s hotel room was indeed a 
“private affair” with article I, section 7 protection, one thing key to the 
Supreme Court of Washington’s analysis was “the nature of the 
information sought—that is, whether the information obtained via the 
governmental trespass reveal[ed] intimate or discrete details of a person’s 
life.”151 The Court reiterated its distaste for “fishing expedition[s]” 
without “an individualized or particularized suspicion about the search 
subject” in deeming the search of Jorden’s room unconstitutional.152 
Five years earlier, in State v. McKinney,153 the Court addressed three 
consolidated cases concerning the arrest of three defendants after law 
enforcement encountered their vehicles in public and subsequently 
accessed their information, including vehicle registration and driver’s 
records.154 The Court’s analysis afforded significance to the historical lack 
of “a constitutionally protected privacy interest in . . . drivers’ records.”155 
In fact, the Court noted, vehicle ownership information was originally 
available to the public “upon request for one dollar.”156 Although the 
historical analysis did not support article I, section 7 protection, the Court 
continued on to see if such protection was one Washington citizens 
“should be entitled to hold” in this particular area.157 As a part of this 
expectation analysis, the Court considered “the extent to which the subject 
matter [was] voluntarily exposed to the public,” as “generally, what is 
voluntarily exposed to the public is not considered to be a part of a 
person’s private affairs.”158 Ultimately, the Court found “no protected 
privacy interest in the information contained in a DOL driver’s record” 
because of the lack of historical privacy, “the fact that these records reveal 
little about a person’s associations, financial dealings, or movements,” 
and the government’s existing ownership of the records.159 
 
149. Id. at 124–25, 156 P.3d at 895. 
150. Id. at 125, 156 P.3d at 895. 
151. Id. at 126, 156 P.3d at 896 (emphasis in original).  
152. Id. at 130, 156 P.3d at 898. 
153. 148 Wash. 2d 20, 60 P.3d 46 (2002). 
154. Id. at 24–25, 60 P.3d at 47–48. 
155. Id. at 27, 60 P.3d at 49. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 29, 60 P.3d at 50 (emphasis in original) (quoting City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 
2d 260, 270, 868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994)). 
158. Id. at 29, 31, 60 P.3d at 50, 51. 
159. Id. at 32, 60 P.3d at 52. 
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And finally, in State v. White,160 the Court considered the opening of a 
locked car trunk by law enforcement during a warrantless inventory 
search.161 In this case, the government argued that the existence of a trunk 
release button in the unlocked glove compartment made the search 
lawful.162 In deciding that such a search was a violation of the defendant’s 
article I, section 7 privacy rights, the Court stated: “The fact an 
automobile may have a trunk release mechanism does not diminish an 
individual’s privacy interests.”163 The privacy interests created by the 
locked trunk were ultimately the most significant to the Court, as opposed 
to the method of access.164 The Court reiterated that “[t]he analysis under 
article I, section 7 focuses, not on a defendant’s actual or subjective 
expectation of privacy but, as we have previously established, on those 
privacy interests Washington citizens held in the past and are entitled to 
hold in the future.”165 These cases show that Washington courts have 
protected Washingtonians’ privacy interests in parts of their lives that are 
far less personal than their family relationships and DNA. 
Furthermore, Washington courts have been consistent in guarding 
privacy interests against technological advancement. For example, in 
State v. Myrick,166 the Supreme Court of Washington illustrated the 
relationship between new technologies and article I, section 7.167 “Merely 
because it is generally known that the technology exists to enable police 
to view private activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point,” 
the Court stated, “it does not follow that these activities are without 
protection.”168 The Court was considering whether law enforcement 
violated article I, section 7 when officers observed marijuana growing on 
a defendant’s property, which was “heavily wooded and bordered by high 
ridges which precluded casual observation,” from a plane flying 1,500 feet 
above ground level.169 The State argued that because the open fields were 
in public view, they were not “private affairs” and as such were not 
protected.170 The Court ultimately held that the warrant issued as a result 
 
160. 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). 
161. Id. at 763–65, 958 P.2d at 983–84. 
162. Id. at 766, 958 P.2d at 984. 
163. Id. at 767, 958 P.2d at 985. 
164. Id. at 767–68, 958 P.2d at 985. 
165. Id. at 768, 958 P.2d at 985 (citing State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510–11, 688 P.2d 151, 
153–54 (1984)). 
166. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). 
167. Id. at 508, 688 P.2d at 152. 
168. Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155. 
169. Id. at 508, 688 P.2d at 152. 
170. Id. at 510, 688 P.2d at 153. 
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of this unconstitutional search was harmless error, but not before 
expressly rejecting an analysis that “rests solely on the legitimacy of a 
defendant’s subjective expectations of privacy.”171 Myrick shows that the 
protections provided by article I, section 7 are not subjective and do not 
diminish as technology reduces citizens’ expectations of privacy.172 This 
stands in contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s “subjective and reasonable 
expectation of privacy” standard.173 
Text messages are also a private affair, even if the phone is in police 
custody at the time the messages are received.174 In State v. Hinton,175 a 
person’s phone was receiving calls and messages while he was in police 
custody.176 An officer used the phone to respond to a text from Shawn 
Hinton, arranged a drug transaction, and arrested Hinton upon his 
arrival.177 The Court found it significant that “[t]ext messages can 
encompass the same intimate subjects as phone calls, sealed letters, and 
other traditional forms of communication that have historically been 
strongly protected under Washington law.”178 The government argued that 
Hinton lost his privacy interest over his phone, although he had no control 
over his receipt of a text message, but the Court stated: “Given the realities 
of modern life, the mere fact that an individual shares information with 
another party and does not control the area from which that information 
is accessed does not place it outside the realm of article I, section 7’s 
protection.”179 The interests the Court protects under this section are those 
that should be protected where the government is concerned, not those 
that are actually protected from the broader public as a result of 
technical advancement. 
C. The Supreme Court of Washington Has Considered the Use of 
DNA by Law Enforcement Under Article I, Section 7 
Multiple Times 
Although the Court has not addressed the article I, section 7 
implications of using DNA for familial DNA searching directly, it has 
 
171. Id. at 513, 515, 688 P.2d at 155, 156. 
172. Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155. 
173. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)). 
174. Id. at 877–78, 319 P.3d at 16–17. 
175. 179 Wash. 2d 862, 319 P.3d 9 (2014). 
176. Id. at 865–66, 319 P.3d at 11. 
177. Id. at 866, 319 P.3d at 11. 
178. Id. at 869–70, 319 P.3d at 13. 
179. Id. at 873, 319 P.3d at 15. 
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previously established that there is a privacy interest in the human body 
and bodily functions.180 However, the privacy interest in a person’s DNA 
depends in large part on how that DNA was obtained.181 The earliest 
discussion of DNA evidence in Washington can be found in cases starting 
in the mid-1990s.182 Since then, the Supreme Court of Washington has 
considered DNA use and collection numerous times.183 The analysis it 
applied in considering other DNA privacy issues, including mandatory 
collection of certain groups’ DNA184 and the testing of DNA that is 
already in law enforcement possession,185 illustrates the framework and 
relevant factors to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of 
familial DNA searching. 
First, in State v. Olivas,186 the defendants entered guilty pleas for 
various violent and sexual offenses.187 Each defendant challenged 
subsequent orders authorizing the State to perform DNA blood tests, 
despite their guilty pleas, as authorized by state statute.188 Although the 
defendants argued that the DNA tests were unconstitutional under both 
the federal and state constitutions, the Court declined to address the state 
constitutional claims on procedural grounds.189 Under the Fourth 
Amendment, however, the Court upheld the statute as constitutional based 
on a special needs analysis, balancing “the general privacy right of 
persons . . . against the ‘special needs beyond normal law enforcement’ of 
the government.”190 In a concurring opinion, Justice Utter instead 
 
180. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000) (“[T]he 
privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one Washington citizens have held, and should be 
entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass.”). 
181. See State v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (2007) (“Certainly the 
nonconsensual collection of blood or urine samples in some circumstances . . . invokes privacy 
concerns; however, obtaining the saliva sample in this case did not involve an invasive or 
involuntary procedure.”). 
182. See State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 37, 882 P.2d 747, 759 (1994); State v. Olivas, 122 
Wash. 2d 73, 76, 856 P.2d 1076, 1077 (1993); State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525, 538, 852 P.2d 
1064, 1071 (1993). 
183. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 365–75, 158 P.3d at 32–38; State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72–
82, 156 P.3d 208, 211–16 (2007); State v. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 820–29, 147 P.3d 1201, 1234–
39 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).  
184. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 74, 156 P.3d at 212; Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 76, 856 P.2d at 1077. 
185. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 825, 147 P.3d at 1236; Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 365–75, 158 P.3d 
at 32–38. 
186. 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993). 
187. Id. at 76–80, 856 P.2d at 1077–79. 
188. Id. at 76, 856 P.2d at 1077; see WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2020). 
189. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 81–82, 856 P.2d at 1080 (finding the defendants failed to brief the 
“six nonexclusive [Gunwall] factors [that] must be briefed before this court will consider an 
independent state constitutional claim”). 
190. Id. at 97–98, 856 P.2d at 1088–89. 
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advocated for a minimally intrusive search test where courts would 
“balance the government’s interest in conducting the search, the degree to 
which the search actually advances that interest, and the gravity of the 
intrusion upon personal privacy.”191 
The same question was raised fourteen years later, in State v. Surge.192 
Six defendants were convicted of felonies and challenged the same state 
DNA statute193 considered in Olivas.194 In its state constitutional analysis, 
the Court focused specifically on “the narrow class of individuals who 
ha[d] been convicted of the listed crimes” in the statute as opposed to “the 
privacy interests of the ordinary citizen.”195 The Court held that no private 
affair had been disturbed and also compared the collection of felons’ DNA 
to the “well established practice of government to collect fingerprints 
from convicted felons for identification purposes.”196 The Court afforded 
significance to the fact that the statute only required DNA collection for 
identification, which the Court did not consider “a disturbance of [the 
defendants’] private affairs.”197 Since the defendants had been convicted, 
they no longer had privacy interest in their identity and the Court viewed 
the DNA collected as just another component of that identity.198 
In 2006, the Court in State v. Gregory199 addressed the question of what 
privacy rights a defendant has when the State already possesses the 
person’s DNA profile.200 Allen Gregory was found guilty of three counts 
of rape in the first degree for a 1998 rape.201 Law enforcement had 
previously suspected Gregory of the 1996 murder of a neighbor, but had 
no way to definitively connect him.202 While he was incarcerated and 
awaiting trial for the 1998 rape, DNA analysis of semen found at the 1996 
scene was compared to blood samples obtained in the 1998 rape.203 
Finding a match, the State charged Gregory with the 1996 murder, for 
which the jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.204 On appeal, 
 
191. Id. at 104, 856 P.2d at 1092 (Utter, J., concurring). 
192. 160 Wash. 2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007). 
193. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754. 
194. State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 69–70, 156 P.3d 208, 210 (2007). 
195. Id. at 72, 156 P.3d at 211. 
196. Id. at 74, 156 P.3d at 212. 
197. Id. at 74, 156 P.3d at 212–13. 
198. Id. at 75, 156 P.3d at 213. 
199. 158 Wash. 2d 759, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). 
200. Id. at 822, 147 P.3d at 1234. 
201. Id. at 778, 147 P.3d at 1212. 
202. Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229–30. 
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Gregory asserted that he had “an expectation of privacy in the information 
contained in his blood . . . and a separate probable cause determination 
was required to support its comparison with the semen collected from the 
[1996] crime scene.”205 The Court concluded that article I, section 7 was 
not implicated “because no additional search occurs when a defendant’s 
DNA profile already in the State’s possession is compared against 
evidence taken from a new crime scene.”206 
The Court examined the constitutional implications of covert DNA 
collection procedures in State v. Athan.207 Police suspected, but were 
unable to charge, John Nicholas Athan in the 1982 murder of 
thirteen-year-old Kristen Sumstad, whose nude body was found with 
semen in her vagina and on her leg.208 Twenty years later, cold case 
detectives tested preserved DNA from the crime scene against state and 
federal databases without success and decided to locate Athan in order to 
compare his DNA to that from the crime scene.209 Because Athan now 
lived in New Jersey, detectives posed as a law firm and “sent Athan a 
letter inviting him to join a fictitious class action lawsuit concerning 
parking tickets.”210 The State then obtained DNA from saliva on the 
envelope containing Athan’s reply, compared it to the semen found on 
Sumstad’s body, and arrested Athan based on the match between the 
two.211 The Court began its analysis by finding “no inherent privacy 
interest in saliva.”212 Because Athan willingly licked the envelope, the 
Court compared it “to a person spitting on the sidewalk or leaving a 
cigarette butt in an ashtray.”213 However, the Court limited this analysis 
to the facts present in the case, where the DNA was used for identification 
only.214 Although it acknowledged in its article I, section 7 analysis that 
“DNA has the potential to reveal a vast amount of personal information, 
including medical conditions and familial relations,” the Court pointed 
out that once Athan sent the letter, what was done with it—including DNA 
testing—was outside of his control.215 
DNA and its use by law enforcement fall within the purview of article I, 
 
205. Id. at 825, 147 P.3d at 1236. 
206. Id. at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238. 
207. 160 Wash. 2d 354, 158 P.3d 27 (2007). 
208. Id. at 362–63, 158 P.3d at 31. 
209. Id. at 363, 158 P.3d at 31. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 363–64, 158 P.3d at 32. 
212. Id. at 367, 158 P.3d at 33. 
213. Id. at 367, 158 P.3d at 33–34. 
214. Id. at 368, 158 P.3d at 34. 
215. Id. at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34. 
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section 7;216 thus, courts will need to consider the factors identified as 
important by the Supreme Court of Washington in the cases above. It is 
necessary to consider this new investigative method under the existing 
article I, section 7 framework because this provision of the Washington 
Constitution is specifically intended to guard privacy rights from threats 
created by “technological advancements.”217 Because familial DNA 
searching has advanced, it is now ripe for consideration. 
IV. THE CONNECTIONS FOUND THROUGH FAMILIAL DNA 
SEARCHING ARE A PRIVATE AFFAIR AND SHOULD BE 
PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
The accepted framework for an article I, section 7 analysis considers: 
(1) the nature and extent of the information which may be obtained; 
(2) the historical treatment of the interest asserted; and (3) the existence 
of authority of law in the form of a warrant or exception to the warrant 
requirement.218 Applying this framework to familial DNA searching as 
currently practiced using commercial DNA databases like GEDmatch 
shows that it is very likely unconstitutional. 
A. The Nature and Extent of the Information that May Be Obtained by 
Familial DNA Searching Supports Article I, Section 7 Protections 
The first question in an article I, section 7 analysis is the “nature and 
extent of the information which may be obtained as a result of the 
governmental conduct.”219 When considering the privacy implications of 
third parties revealing sensitive information about others, Washington 
courts consider the method by which the information is obtained as well 
as the “personal details” revealed by the information itself.220 In cases 
involving familial DNA searching, although law enforcement utilizes the 
DNA collected at the crime scene in order to perform the search, the 
information at issue is the family connections and relationships made 
available through the search. Indeed, if the issue was only the DNA itself, 
under Athan there is little question that a court would find no privacy 
 
216. See id. at 365–68, 158 P.3d at 33–34.  
217. See State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 877–78, 319 P.3d 9, 17 (2014) (“Article I, section 7 
protects Washington citizens from governmental intrusion into affairs that they should be entitled to 
hold safe from governmental trespass, regardless of technological advancements.”). 
218. Id. at 868–69, 319 P.3d at 12 (citing State v. Miles, 160 Wash. 2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864, 868 
(2007)); State v. Witkowski, 3 Wash. App. 2d 318, 336, 415 P.3d 639, 648 (2018). 
219. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d 577, 586, 451 P.3d 1060, 1069 (2019) (quoting Miles, 160 
Wash. 2d at 244, 156 P.3d at 868). 
220. Id. at 586–87, 451 P.3d at 1069. 
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interest inherent in it.221 
In cases involving familial DNA searching, however, law enforcement 
departs from the realm of simple DNA identification and enters that of the 
“vast amount of personal information, including . . . familial relations” 
acknowledged by the Athan Court.222 In identifying a suspect through 
familial DNA searching, the government implicates the personal 
information of at least two individuals—the suspect themselves and the 
family member (or members) who uploaded their information to the 
commercial database—as well as the connection between them.223 
The method through which law enforcement obtains the familial 
connections through familial DNA searching demonstrates that these 
connections are a “private affair.” Like GPS devices and infrared thermal 
devices, these websites do not “merely augment [an] officer[’s] senses.”224 
Although an officer can arguably identify family relationships through 
context and official documents, an officer cannot build a family tree based 
on DNA out to a third or fourth cousin relationship without this 
technology. Familial DNA searching enables law enforcement to replace 
traditional senses and investigatory techniques with a “technological 
substitute.”225 This enhancement is evidenced by the use of this new 
technology to solve cold cases, where traditional investigatory methods 
have failed for years.226 The Golden State Killer crimes, the Michella 
Welch murder, and the murders of Jay Cook and Tanya van Cuylenberg 
all took place in the 1970s and 1980s—but none of the men eventually 
arrested decades later were ever suspects prior to being identified by 
familial DNA searching.227 Because familial DNA searching is not merely 
an augmentation of existing senses, the genetic family relationships are a 
private affair that would not be identified without the technology. 
The Supreme Court of Washington has already indicated that the type 
of personal information identified through familial DNA searching may 
be indicative of a private affair.228 Given that the potential for text 
 
221. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 367, 158 P.3d at 33 (finding no inherent privacy interest in saliva). 
222. Id. at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34. 
223. See supra section II.A. 
224. State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 262, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (2003); see State v. Young, 123 
Wash. 2d 173, 182–84, 867 P.2d 593, 597–98 (1994). 
225. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d at 262, 76 P.3d at 223. 
226. Romano, supra note 2; Clare McGrane, Patricia Murphy & Alec Cowan, This Horrific Cold 
Case Could Be Solved by Tracing the Murderer’s Family Tree, KUOW (June 25, 2019 10:05 PM), 
https://www.kuow.org/stories/the-horrific-cold-case-that-might-be-solved-by-tracing-the-suspect-s-
family-tree [https://perma.cc/3YL7-2VKK]. 
227. See Romano, supra note 2; McGrane et al., supra note 226; Bessex, supra note 18. 
228. State v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007) (declining to consider the 
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messages to reveal details about familial associations has weighed in favor 
of article I, section 7 protection,229 the detailed family tree that can be 
created based on DNA surely weighs in favor of this same protection. 
Even assuming that a person’s readily visible family relationships are easy 
to identify, genetic family relationships will not always be the same, nor 
will they be readily identifiable.230 Thus, the nature and extent of private 
information that a family tree based on DNA can provide is expansive. 
B. The Historical Treatment of the Privacy Interest Asserted in DNA, 
Identity, and Family Relationships Supports Article I, Section 7 
Protections 
The historical treatment of three different privacy interests are relevant 
to an article I, section 7 analysis of familial DNA searches: DNA,231 
identity,232 and family relationships.233 The historical treatment of DNA is 
mixed and highly dependent on how the DNA was obtained.234 The crime 
scene DNA does not in and of itself implicate article I, section 7, because 
it is already in the government’s possession.235 That DNA in these cases 
would present a nearly identical analysis to that of the DNA contained in 
the defendant’s semen in Gregory.236 However, unlike the DNA hosted 
on the commercial DNA databases, Gregory’s comparison sample was 
already in the government’s possession.237 The DNA of the family 
member who used the database, in contrast, was not. Thus, the privacy 
interest in the comparison DNA is no different than the interest any other 
Washington resident has in theirs, meaning it is protected. 
 
potential for DNA to reveal medical conditions and familial relations in that particular case, but 
calling the concerns themselves valid). 
229. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868–70, 319 P.3d 9, 12–13 (2014). 
230. See FED. INTERAGENCY F. ON CHILD & FAM. STATS., AMERICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL 
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, 2019, at 2–3 (2019), https://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2019/ac_19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2NJ-XP2J] (finding that 3.1 million children did not live with a parent in 2018, 
25% of which lived with nonrelatives). 
231. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 366–67, 158 P.3d at 33; State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72–74, 
156 P.3d 208, 211–12 (2007); State v. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201, 1237–38 
(2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014); 
State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 92–93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1993). 
232. See Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72–73, 156 P.3d at 211–12. 
233. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34. 
234. Compare Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238 (holding defendant had no privacy 
interest in DNA already in the State’s possession), with Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72–74, 156 P.3d at 
211–12 (suggesting that ordinary citizens would have a privacy interest in their identity if faced with 
mandatory DNA sampling). 
235. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229. 
Parman (1)  (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2020  6:01 PM 
2020] THE THICKNESS OF BLOOD 2083 
 
There are strong indicators of a historical privacy interest in their 
identity for the suspects who did not willingly participate in the database. 
Washington courts have previously recognized a right to privacy in one’s 
identity.238 This interest has previously been overcome when those 
asserting it are incarcerated felons239 or the subject of a Public Records 
Act240 request,241 but even the family members who voluntarily put their 
DNA information in an online database have not completely removed 
their privacy interests from the protection of article I, section 7.242 
Historically, courts are protective of identity absent a clear surrender of 
this interest. Here, it is unlikely that the defendants would be able to 
challenge the violation of their contributing family member’s 
constitutional rights.243 However, the defendant may be able to bring a 
constitutional challenge because of the privacy interest in their own 
identity, which is necessarily linked to the family member’s DNA in 
the database.244 
Two (or more) parties could assert a privacy interest in the implicated 
family connections—the owner of the crime scene DNA and any family 
member whose DNA is in the commercial database.245 Because the 
suspect at the time of the search has presumably not been convicted of 
anything, their privacy interest in their family connections and identity is 
that of an ordinary citizen and this same analysis applies to all members 
of the family.246 The difference, in fact, is between the members of the 
 
238. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wash. 2d 398, 414, 259 P.3d 190, 198 
(2011) (holding that a police officer maintains his right to privacy in his identity despite media 
coverage); Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wash. 2d 199, 205, 212, 
189 P.3d 139, 142, 146 (2008) (holding that teachers facing unsubstantiated allegations of abuse have 
a right to privacy in their identities). 
239. See Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72, 156 P.3d at 211. 
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2020). 
241. See Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, 194 
Wash. 2d 484, 502, 450 P.3d 601, 610 (2019) (holding that birth dates of state employees are not 
exempt from disclosure). 
242. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 873, 319 P.3d 9, 15 (2014) (“[T]he mere fact that an 
individual shares information with another party and does not control the area from which that 
information is accessed does not place it outside the realm of article I, section 7’s protection.”). 
243. See id. at 869 n.2, 319 P.3d at 12 n.2 (“Generally, article I, section 7 rights may be enforced 
by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own privacy rights were infringed by 
government action.”). 
244. Id. (“Hinton had standing to challenge the search of Lee’s phone if the search disturbed a 
privacy interest he had in his text messages to Lee.”). 
245. See supra section II.A. 
246. State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72, 156 P.3d 208, 211 (2007) (“In this case, the ‘private 
affairs’ inquiry focuses on a convicted felon’s asserted privacy interest in his or her identity, not on 
the privacy interests of the ordinary citizen. The distinction is important to our inquiry because the 
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family who chose to put their DNA into the commercial database, and 
those, including the suspect, who did not. 
Washington courts have previously acknowledged a privacy interest in 
family relationships. In determining that cell-site location information is 
a private affair, the Supreme Court of Washington considered that this 
data “can expose personal details about family, politics, religion, and 
sexual associations.”247 The Court, although declining to adopt an 
evidentiary privilege for parent-child communications, also stated in dicta 
that there is a “familial right to privacy . . . [which] extends to 
fundamental personal rights.”248 This assertion is supported on the federal 
level by the series of United States Supreme Court cases that have 
protected family privacy and autonomy.249 
Thus, when viewing the intersection of genetic identity and privacy at 
the heart of the issue, the historical treatment of both weighs in favor of 
protection under article I, section 7. Since familial DNA searching is 
unconstitutional, it cannot support a search warrant to confirm a suspect’s 
DNA match with the original crime scene DNA.250 Any taking of the 
suspect’s DNA to determine a match with the crime scene DNA, 
therefore, would need to rest on other grounds or fall within one of the 
narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.251 
V. THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Washingtonians like their privacy. In January 2020, ten privacy-related 
bills, including a new version of the Washington Privacy Act,252 were 
introduced in the state legislative session.253 The Washington Privacy Act 
itself states, “Washingtonians cherish privacy as an element of their 
individual freedom,” and “Washington is a technology leader on a 
 
statute involved in this case applies only to the narrow class of individuals who have been convicted 
of the listed crimes, and the focus must be on their rights.”). 
247. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d 577, 589, 451 P.3d 1060, 1070 (2019) (emphasis added). 
248. State v. Maxon, 110 Wash. 2d 564, 570, 756 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1988). 
249. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 
541–42 (1942) (procreation). 
250. See State v. Ross, 141 Wash. 2d 304, 311–12, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (2000) (laying out the 
consequences of a search violating article I, section 7). 
251. Id. at 312, 4 P.3d at 135. 
252. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (Second Substitute Senate Bill 5376). 
253. Pollyanna Sanderson, Katelyn Ringrose & Stacey Gray, It’s Raining Privacy Bills: An 
Overview of the Washington State Privacy Act and Other Introduced Bills, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Jan. 
13, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/01/13/its-raining-privacy-bills-an-overview-of-the-washington-state-
privacy-act-and-other-introduced-bills/ [https://perma.cc/C3A4-TTCR]. 
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national and global level.”254 Despite this, the Washington Privacy Act 
does not mention DNA,255 nor do nine other privacy bills from 
the session.256 
The only current bill that addresses DNA privacy is still in committee 
review as of November 2020 and falls far short of what Washington 
residents need.257 This bill specifically concerns the “collection, use, and 
disclosure of genetic data by direct-to-consumer genetic testing 
companies” and lays out a series of requirements for these entities when 
handling consumer genetic data.258 However, when it comes to law 
enforcement involvement, the bill merely demands “valid legal process 
for disclosing genetic data to law enforcement without a consumer’s 
express consent.”259 This requirement is insufficient to adequately protect 
privacy rights. First, following a valid legal process will not absolve 
familial DNA searching of the sin of violating Washingtonians’ privacy 
rights. Second, the consumer’s consent does not mean that the consumer’s 
family, also implicated in these searches, has consented.260 
If Washington truly aspires to protect its residents’ highly valued 
privacy, it should follow the lead of Maryland and the District of 
Columbia and institute a law prohibiting familial DNA searching, but then 
go further to prohibit law enforcement searches of this type on both 
government and commercial DNA databases.261 Although a court would 
likely find that this type of investigative method is unconstitutional under 
the Washington Constitution,262 there is no need for the legislature to wait 
for this to play out in the courts. The legislature can move more quickly 
and act to adequately protect the privacy interests of all Washington 
residents in their DNA and the information it contains. 
And so the legislature should. Whatever the constitutional implications, 
permitting such law enforcement use of this technology is no different 
than permitting distant family members to give consent for a blood draw 
on behalf of one another. Washington does not allow the collection of 
 
254. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 2(a)–(b) (Wash. 2019) (Second Substitute Senate 
Bill 5376). 
255. See id. 
256. See Sanderson et al., supra note 253. 
257. See H.R. 2485, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
258. Id. at 1. 
259. Id. § 2(1)(c). 
260. See supra section IV.A. 
261. See supra section I.B. 
262. See supra Part IV. 
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arrestee DNA,263 and allowing law enforcement to obtain the DNA of 
citizens in this backdoor manner violates the privacy that citizens of the 
state so cherish. Although familial DNA searching is likely 
unconstitutional,264 it may take some time for the courts to reach this issue. 
Securing this important privacy right through the legislative process will 
send a clear message to law enforcement that such use of these websites 
is unacceptable to Washingtonians. Given the potential for permanent 
harm to individual and family privacy, the legislature will be failing 
present and future constituents by sitting idly by. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of familial DNA searching to solve crimes is increasing.265 In 
Washington, one county alone has used this technique to solve three cold 
murder cases in the past year.266 When doing these searches, law 
enforcement checks crime scene DNA against commercial and open 
source DNA databases that very likely contain samples uploaded without 
the consumer knowing they could be used in this manner.267 These are not 
small databases—they contain millions of samples and can be used to 
identify the majority of the American public.268 
This leaves Washington with a difficult constitutional problem: even if 
such searches are acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, is this not one 
of the technological advancements from which article I, section 7 protects 
Washingtonians’ privacy?269 This Comment argues that this is such an 
advancement and that genetic information and family connections are 
“private affairs” protected by the Washington Constitution. The highly 
personal information that can be uncovered through our DNA, coupled 
 
263. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1)(a) (2020) (mandating collection of biological samples 
from “[e]very adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony, or any of the following crimes” 
(emphasis added)). 
264. See supra Part IV. 
265. Aaron Mak, We May Be Entering a New Era for Using Consumer Genetic Information to 
Solve Crime, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/gedmatch-
warrant-dna-ancestry-23andme.html [https://perma.cc/X9HX-ZY95] (explaining that GEDmatch had 
been used to identify at least fifty-nine suspects as of April 2019). 
266. Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Press Release, supra note 19. 
267. See supra section II.A; Selk, supra note 6. 
268. Kolata & Murphy, supra note 26; Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be 
Identified Through Genealogy Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html 
[https://perma.cc/TMG3-V3SS]. 
269. See State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 877–78, 319 P.3d 9, 17 (2014) (“Article I, section 7 
protects Washington citizens from governmental intrusion into affairs that they should be entitled to 
hold safe from governmental trespass, regardless of technological advancements.”). 
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with Washington courts’ historically protective treatment of citizens’ 
privacy interests in DNA, identity, and familial relationships, brings this 
interest well within the protective purview of article I, section 7.270 As a 
result, when presented with this issue Washington’s courts should take 
care to protect these interests. 
Ultimately, however, the privacy interests at play here are too precious 
and the risks too great to wait for this to work its way through the court 
system. Washington’s legislature should thus follow Maryland and the 
District of Columbia to secure such privacy to Washington citizens by 
passing legislation that forbids familial DNA searching by Washington 
law enforcement, in both state and commercial DNA databases.271 
  
 
270. See supra Part IV. 
271. See supra Part V. 
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